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This article takes the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome as an opportunity to 
reflect upon half a century of academic discourse about the European Union (EU) and its 
antecedents. In what follows I will resist the rather obvious temptation simply to explain 
the intellectual evolution of what we now call EU studies in terms of the changing form 
and character of the EU over time.1 Rather, the intention is to offer a somewhat more 
complex picture of the relationship between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ in this field of 
enquiry. While there are obvious—indeed, undeniable—moments at which the academic 
study of the EU and European integration has shifted markedly in response to discernible 
changes or emergent trends in its object, the contention here is that this is a partial and 
largely unhelpful way of thinking about the disciplinary history of the subfield of EU 
studies. While breaks with earlier modes of enquiry or the opening of new avenues of 
investigation in EU studies may reflect the impact of real-world trends upon academic 
purpose, those trends cannot explain the precise forms that intellectual work has taken. 
 
At the very least, scholarship requires the choice (one hopes, the conscious choice) of 
approaches to subject-matter. Intellectual interest may be aroused inductively—that is, 
through an initial observation that persuades a scholar of the value or necessity of 
research. Yet the conduct of that research requires the selection of approaches and/or 
theories which enable the resultant knowledge to be ordered meaningfully. There are, of 
course, a number of determinants of knowledge production. At one level the choice of a 
theory or an approach may reflect a ‘horses for courses’ attitude to social enquiry. This 
suggests that the investigator’s job is to select the ‘best’ available conceptual toolkit to 
                                                 
1 The term ‘EU studies’ is used here to describe the totality of academic work from across 
a range of social scientific fields that has engaged with and theorized about European 
integration and the institutional, policy-making and governance dimensions of what is 
now called the European Union. 
organize research in the domain under scrutiny. It may be that a single theory cannot 
account for all aspects of a phenomenon; different theories may offer the ‘best fit’ for 
different aspects. Similar processes might also emerge from more deductive, discipline-
based reasoning. In this case real-world phenomena are seen as useful sites for the 
examination of theoretical propositions or for the competitive testing of theories against 
one another. In some instances it may be that a political event appears to challenge or run 
contrary to received wisdoms in a discipline or subdiscipline. Its investigation 
accordingly becomes a matter of urgency for disciplinary progress. 
 
In short, social research emerges as a consequence of one or other of these logics 
(inductive or deductive)—or perhaps, more often than not, through some blend of the 
two. In any case, what should be clear that the encounter between an object of study 
(such as the EU/European integration) and the production of knowledge about that object 
is not a neutral or innocent exercise. Put simply, the conditions of intellectual knowledge 
production reflect assumptions, biases, trends and debates within the academy. This is 
why deep ‘internal’ understandings of academic fields are necessary for a full critical 
appreciation of their current state of play and are, at the same time, vital supplements to 
standard ‘externalist’ readings.2 EU studies is a particularly fertile site on which to see 
these dynamics at play. Without understanding the broader social scientific and 
disciplinary contexts from which work emerges (‘internalist’ drivers), we have no basis 
                                                 
2 Brian C. Schmidt, The political discourse of anarchy: a disciplinary history of 
international relations (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998); Brian C. Schmidt, ‘On the 
history and historiography of International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse 
and Beth A. Simmons, eds, Handbook of international relations (London: Sage, 2002), 
pp. 3–22; Wolfgang Wessels, ‘Cleavages, controversies and convergence in European 
Union studies’, in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne, eds, Palgrave advances in 
European Union studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Ole Wæver, ‘The 
sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in 
International Relations’, International Organization 52: 4 (1998), pp. 687–727. 
for understanding why events in the world of European integration (‘externalist’ drivers) 
elicit particular academic responses. 
 
What follows, therefore, is a critical contextual discussion of EU studies over time. There 
is no attempt here to offer a singular history of the field of EU studies, but there is a move 
to interrogate the assumptions that lie beneath many representations of the field’s 
evolution. It may seem that raking over a field’s past represents something of a 
distraction from the important business of getting on with current research. However, the 
central premise of this contribution is that there is a lot at stake in how the past of EU 
studies is represented. Telling stories about past academic efforts has the effect of 
legitimizing particular and perhaps partial intellectual moves in the present. Should the 
historiographic rationale of such moves be contested, then the quality, utility, desirability 
and plausibility of present work come under closer scrutiny. 
 
The article begins by identifying two factors that govern the evolution of any academic 
field: scholarly contingency (the fact that scholarship does not proceed with free agency, 
but is bound by various conditions) and disciplinary politics (the idea that the course of 
academic work is governed by power games and that there are likely to be significant 
disagreements about best practice and progress in a field). In terms of EU studies, the 
thrust of disciplinary politics tends towards an opposition between ‘mainstreaming’ and 
‘pluralist’ versions of the political science of EU studies. These observations feed the 
largely ‘internalist’ approach of this contribution. The article goes on to show how 
‘externalist’ readings might give a general guide to how EU studies has progressed, but 
cannot ultimately adjudicate on the particular forms of scholarly enquiry that have driven 
EU studies over time. The final section explores how, in the face of emerging monistic 
claims about propriety in the field, an effective pluralist political science of the EU might 
be enhanced. 
 
Scholarly contingency and disciplinary politics 
This approach to intellectual history leads to two broad observations about the evolution 
of EU studies. The first concerns the contingent character of academic work. 
‘Contingent’ in this sense is not meant to imply randomness, but rather to acknowledge 
that scholars approach their object under intellectual circumstances that are not entirely of 
their own making. The point is to deepen our understanding of the relationship between 
the development of the EU and the academic study of the EU as more than a matter of 
scholars playing a game of ‘catch-up’ with an often fast-moving empirical entity. For one 
thing, what is deemed to be significantly empirical{?} is, of course, dependent upon an a 
priori intellectual move. This is why, for example, we need to be careful with ideas such 
as the claim that the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s within the Communities 
was one of ‘Eurosclerosis’ (a combination of nationalist–protectionist political economy 
impulses at the domestic level and institutional and integrative inertia at the supranational 
level). It may be entirely correct to say that, at an intergovernmental level, member-state 
preferences were quite divergent and that the economic crises of the early 1970s elicited 
autarchic rather than ‘open’ (and thus integrative) policy responses. But to move from 
there to the idea that integrative momentum had ipso facto broken down is to privilege 
intergovernmental consensus as the key signifier of integration and in turn to suggest that 
significant integration occurs only at the moment when member states’ preferences are 
aligned to the point where the treaties are revised. A quite different picture of the 1960s 
and 1970s emerges if these axioms are relaxed and scholars look elsewhere—principally 
within the institutional substructure of the Communities and in particular at the emerging 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice—for significant, transformative activity 
with long-term effects.3 By the same token, we should be similarly cautious of any rush 
to judgement on the bigger implications of the failure of the constitutional treaty to secure 
domestic popular approval in France and the Netherlands in 2005, especially where 
                                                 
3 See J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal 100: 8, 1991, 
pp. 2405–503; Daniel Wincott, ‘Institutional interaction and European integration: 
towards an everyday critique of liberal intergovernmentalism’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 33: 4, 1995, pp. 597–609. 
referendum outcomes are taken as definitive evidence of systemic breakdown within the 
EU or of popular insurgency against the project of integration.4
 
Therefore, to simplify, one implication of intellectual ‘contingency’ is this: not only is 
our explanation of European integration the product of theoretical choice, but also our 
very conceptualization of the realities of European integration and governance (what we 
take to be significant facets of the EU and its predecessors) is bound up with our 
scholarly choices and theoretical preferences. This tendency is remarkably acute in EU 
studies, and with good reason. Since its inception in the 1950s, what we now know as the 
EU has consistently thrown large-scale empirical challenges to the observer trained in the 
classification and explanation of political, legal and economic phenomena. 
 
However, the social scientific mind is perhaps best characterized by the enduring 
presence of two countervailing predispositions: the predisposition to seek out the new and 
unfamiliar on the one hand, and the predisposition to render the unfamiliar familiar on the 
other. The second of these is what James Rosenau and Mary Durfee have in mind when 
they ask that scholarship be driven by a simple question: ‘of what is this an instance?’5 
This suggests that we as scholars should do our level best to ensure that the phenomena 
we observe are labelled in terms that social science understands; and, for the most part, 
we probably do. The European Parliament is thus treated as a legislature akin to national 
parliaments, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is evaluated in terms that make 
sense to scholars of foreign policy analysis, and so on. The clear advantage of this 
strategy is the acquisition of analytical leverage: the ability to make plausible conjectures 
and generalizations from the EU case that are not just about the EU case. Without 
analytical leverage, runs the argument, we have little except thick description or 
journalism. At best, thick description gives the social scientist some pre-theoretical raw 
                                                 
4 See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘What can we learn from the collapse of the European 
constitutional project?’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 42: 7, 2006, pp. 219–41. 
5 James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking theory thoroughly: coherent approaches 
to an incoherent world (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 2–4. 
material (some data) from which hypotheses can be generated, at which point the social 
scientific enterprise begins.6
 
Yet the obvious cautionary note to sound is that this tendency to ‘familiarize’ the EU 
might seriously downgrade its novelty, its distinctiveness and its potentially transcendent 
qualities. Rosenau and Durfee’s question could, after all, be answered with a bemused ‘I 
don’t know!’ The story of EU studies can be (and often is) read in terms of a constant 
tension between rival ideal-typical macro-interpretations of European integration and the 
institutional forms it has taken. At one extreme is the claim that the net result of more 
than half a century of institutional evolution is a polity with neither historical precedent 
nor contemporary parallel. The production of knowledge about the EU should, it follows, 
be concerned with fashioning new social scientific approaches that are capable of 
capturing this novel object. At the other extreme sits the impulse to treat everything the 
EU generates in terms of the categories of tried and trusted social scientific scholarship. 
Adopting a position along a continuum between these two poles is, of course, a matter of 
encountering the real world of the EU and making a judgement upon it. But it is an 
encounter that cannot be separated from the scholar’s position on matters of epistemology 
and social scientific propriety. 
 
This line of thought connects to the second broad foundational observation from which 
this piece commences. Put simply, EU studies, past and present, is a highly fruitful venue 
for exploring disciplinary politics in the social sciences. The term ‘disciplinary politics’ 
carries two connotations. The first is the suggestion, in line with the foregoing, that the 
way in which the EU is ‘read’ in academic work follows, in substantial part at least, from 
factors endogenous to the academy and to the disciplines that comprise it. As such, a 
proper appreciation of the ebbs and flows of a field like EU studies requires an 
understanding of the dynamics of its contributing academic disciplines. The second 
                                                 
6 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing social inquiry: scientific 
inference in qualitative research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 
35–43. 
connotation draws upon the double meaning of ‘discipline’, a term used to describe not 
only a way of organizing scholarly enquiry in a delimited area of enquiry, but also a 
means by which rules are enforced and through which power is exercised in the 
production of knowledge. Research in the sociology of knowledge reminds us that 
academic communities—disciplines—are social networks possessing (a) complex rules 
about what is considered admissible work, (b) well-established norms about the proper 
way to conduct research and present the results of scholarship and (c) often clear senses 
of where disciplinary boundaries reside.7 The capacity to define these three facets of 
disciplinarity—admissibility, conduct and borders—reflects power structures within 
disciplines, and struggles for ‘the soul’ of disciplines often reflect profound disagreement 
about these questions.8
 
These questions of disciplinary politics feed into EU studies in several ways. The first 
issue to consider is the extent to which EU studies is and has been a field that ‘belongs’ 
predominantly to one recognized academic discipline. Is political science, for example, 
the appropriate ‘home turf’ of the field? On the face of it, this would seem to be 
something of a non-issue. As is well known, European integration and the EU are written 
about extensively across a range of fields other than political science. Most prominent 
among these are economics, history and legal studies, with a clear trend suggesting 
increasing interest from sociologists. Indeed, the data provided by the peak organization 
of the world’s 52 formally constituted European Community Studies Associations 
(ECSAs) imply that political science is a ‘minority sport’ within EU studies. Less than 10 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Julie T. Klein, Crossing boundaries: knowledge, disciplinarities and 
interdisciplinarities (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996); Peter 
Mancias, A history and philosophy of the social sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); 
Peter Wagner, Björn Wittrock and Richard Whitley, eds, Discourses on society: the 
shaping of the social scientific disciplines (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). 
8 For a clear example in (American) political science, see Kerstin Renwick Monroe, ed., 
Perestroika! The raucous rebellion in political science (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2005). 
per cent of the national associations categorize 50 per cent or more of their membership 
as ‘political science’. However, the two largest associations—the Universities 
Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) in the UK and the European 
Union Studies Association (EUSA) in the United States—account for a little under 40 per 
cent of the global EU studies community, and both carry political science majorities.9 
This would seem to suggest that a significant proportion of anglophone academic 
research on the EU emanates from the broad discipline area of political science. 
 
If we confine our review of EU studies to those interventions that self-consciously deal 
with EU politics, then the question about ‘home turf’ is better posed in terms of the 
internal disciplinary politics of political science. As is well known, political science is a 
far from settled field, and considerable discussion goes on about its scope and 
boundaries. As such, the study of politics in relation to a given phenomenon intersects 
with debates about admissibility, conduct and borders within political science. Moreover, 
the precise nature, cleavage structure and intensity of these debates will vary over time as 
particular concerns wax and wane. At the risk of oversimplification, table 1 offers a 
stylized and ideal-typical juxtaposition of two models of the study of EU politics. This 
identifies the disciplinary politics of EU studies across three dimensions of debate that 
not only consider whether EU politics is a matter for political science alone or for a wider 
cluster of cognate communities, but also raise fundamental questions about the nature of 
the object (the EU/European integration) and how it should be studied.  
 
Table 1: Two models of the study of EU politics 
 
The mainstreaming model The pluralistic model 
 
The EU is a polity ‘like any other’ that lends itself 
to the intellectual technologies developed over 
time by mainstream political science 
 
The study of EU politics is best served by the 
standard tools of political science. 
 
Good political science conforms to a set of 
 
The EU is a new type of polity. The tools of 
standard political science may not be appropriate  
 
 
The study of EU politics is an inherently 
multidisciplinary affair. 
 
The study of EU politics benefits from the input 
                                                 
9 http://www.ecsanet.org, accessed XX XXXX. 2007.{?} 
standardized epistemological positions and 
methodological rules of thumb. 
 




Source: The table is a reorganization of table 1.4 in Ben Rosamond, ‘The political sciences 
of European integration: disciplinary history and EU studies’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, 
Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of European Union politics 
(London: Sage, 2007), p. 15. 
 
 
This juxtaposition invites us to organize in a similar way thinking on the two 
foundational observations made here about the contingency of academic enquiry on the 
one hand and the disciplinary politics of EU studies on the other. The mainstreaming 
model offers a conception of the study of EU politics confident that established social 
scientific approaches, theories and techniques will be able to capture European 
integration and the development of the EU. In other words, this ideal type is rooted in the 
certainty that the ‘of what is this an instance?’ question is answerable. Moreover, it holds 
that the object is so familiar that established political science can deliver effective 
knowledge without taking itself away from well-established tenets; indeed, that the study 
of the EU should be aligned to that which is deemed to be ‘cutting edge’ in the tightly 
defined discipline of political science{?}. Pushed to its logical extreme, this position 
would maintain that analytical leverage is obtained only via rigorous comparison with 
other political systems and not with other cases of regional integration. As such it pushes 
International Relations (IR) very much to the margins of the EU studies enterprise. 
 
The pluralistic ideal type is, in contrast, hostile to acts of disciplinary closure. It 
advocates what Warleigh calls ‘intradisciplinarity’ within political science (a mixture of 
non-judgemental internal communication to avoid intellectual ‘Balkanization’ and 
openness to the possibilities offered by ‘non-political science’),10 together—at its 
limits—with a refusal to privilege political science as the most virtuous source of 
                                                 
10 Alex Warleigh, ‘In defence of intra-disciplinarity: “European studies”, the “new 
regionalism” and the issue of democratisation’, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 17: 2, 2004, pp. 301–18. 
knowledge about EU politics. At the core of this position is an ontological restlessness 
about the assumption that the EU is a polity like any other; a feeling that to use standard 
political science on the EU is to impose upon it a set of potentially inappropriate 
categories that might harm effective conceptualization or generalization. One 
‘anthropological’ version of this position could, of course, argue that the fact that the EU 
is sui generis—that n = 1—should not bother us in the slightest. To demand analytical 
leverage via comparability emerges from a particular conception of social science that 
insists upon general rather than particular forms of knowledge. So diversity of 
disciplinary starting points is not the only requirement. A commitment to diverse (often 
unconventional) approaches, theories and methods is both appropriate and effective. 
 
Needless to say, we are unlikely to discover precise replicas of either of these stances in 
the history of studies of European integration and the EU. Like all ideal types, the two 
models are better thought of as ends of a continuum towards which different authors, 
schools and literatures tend. Posing them as stark, stylized alternatives highlights some 
salient ‘internalist’ issues that help to form a picture of how matters of scholarly 
contingency and disciplinary politics have played out in half a century of EU studies. 
 
External drivers and the shaping of EU studies 
It is important to recognize, notwithstanding the thrust of the ‘internalist’ argument 
advanced above, that internal drivers of the character of EU studies intersect with 
external factors associated with the EU and its evolution. The latter, as Wessels observes, 
pull analysts of the EU into particular domains of enquiry.11 That these are recognized as 
pull factors, let alone that they lead to particular forms of scholarly activity, is the 
consequence of the mix of scholarly contingency and disciplinary politics suggested 
above. As a precursor to the analysis that follows, an indicative list of the more obvious 
external pull factors is laid out in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: External/pull drivers of the study of European integration/the EU 
 
                                                 
11 Wessels, ‘Cleavages’, pp. 240–43. 
Public debate  
• articulation of problems/quest for solutions 
• politicization of integration/aspects of the EU 
• emergence of ideas and buzzwords in public discourse 
 
Treaties and history-making moments 
• foundation of the Communities  
• treaty reform 
• Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) 
 
Institutional evolution 
• reform of institutions; acquisition of new formal powers/competences 
• changing inter-institutional balance of power 
• intra-institutional change (e.g. voting rules within institutions) 
• informal operation of institutions 
 
Constitutionalization 
• cumulative political significance of European-level jurisprudence 
• normative implications (democracy, legitimacy, citizenship) 
 
Policy change and governance 
• emergence of new areas of EU policy competence 
• the mix of policy actors within the EU system 
• cumulative impact of policy outputs  
• evolution of/emergence of new or additional modes of governance 
 
Intersection of the EU and member-state political systems 
• domestic adaptation to EU inputs 
• national ‘uploads’ to the EU 
• domestic politics of European integration 
 
Enlargement 
• politics of accession in new member states 
• implications for institutional and policy balance within the EU system 
 
Intersection of the EU and the international/global system 
• ramifications of EU external action 
• influence of global/international factors upon the conduct of European integration and 
EU politics 
 
These external drivers have stimulated scholarship in different sorts of ways. Most 
obviously, salient events or processes prompt research, publication and other forms of 
academic consolidation. For example, enlargement—particularly at moments when it 
appears to throw up significant challenges to the integrity of the EU system (as with the 
1973 and 2005 enlargements)—seems to coincide with intensive phases of publication 
activity on the topic.12 The formal evolution of the EU’s institutions appears to have 
provoked an abundance of work. So, to take but one example, the gradual accumulation 
of powers by the European Parliament, together with the development of party groups, 
discernible patterns of voting behaviour and the Parliament’s status as a co-legislator, 
would seem to account for the growth of the subfield of EU legislative politics.13 The 
EU’s visible status as a policy system is reflected in the foundation of the Journal of 
European Public Policy in 1994 and the discernible rise of policy-analytic work on the 
EU since the 1980s.14 Its enhanced foreign and security policy competences, together 
with the now dense web of EU external relations, would seem to provide the rationale of 
the specialist journal European Foreign Affairs Review (founded 1996), together with the 
(re)appearance of IR and foreign policy scholarship with an EU focus.15 The emergence 
of discernible variations from the classic Monnet model of policy-making generates 
appeals for work that examines the full array of governance modes at work within the 
EU.16 In particular, the management of the single market through a regulatory policy 
                                                 
12 John Keeler, ‘Mapping EU studies: the evolution from boutique to boom field 1960–
2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies 43: 3, 2005, p. 571. 
13 See Gail McElroy, ‘Legislative Politics’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and 
Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of European Union politics (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 
175–94. 
14 Helen Wallace and William Wallace, ‘Overview: the European Union, politics and 
policy-making’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, 
Handbook of European Union politics (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 339–58. 
15 Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds, International Relations and the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. 
Williams, eds, International Relations theory and the politics of European integration: 
power, security and community (London: Routledge, 2000). 
16 Helen Wallace, ‘An institutional anatomy and five policy modes’, in Helen Wallace, 
William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, eds, Policy-making in the European Union, 5th 
style has conjoined the study of the EU to broader ideas about the regulatory state.17 The 
acquisition by the Communities/the EU of new competences in areas such as 
environmental policy has the dual effect of attracting scholars of the areas in question (at 
both national and global levels) to EU studies and forcing existing analysts of European 
integration to develop explanations of how that policy competence was acquired. The 
case of environmental policy is especially interesting in this regard because of its de facto 
appearance prior to its de jure enactment in the treaties.18
 
Political theorists have been keen to emphasize a ‘normative turn’ in EU studies, where 
debates that have informed moral and political philosophy for centuries—debates about 
legitimacy, democracy and citizenship—have come to the fore in the day-to-day practices 
of EU politics or follow logically from the evolution of the treaties or proposed revisions 
to the treaties.19 As such, the ‘normative turn’ represents the supply of bespoke{?} 
concepts and modes of reasoning that enrich the field—and force it to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 49–90; Manuele Citi and Martin 
Rhodes, ‘New modes of governance in the European Union: a critical survey and 
analysis’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook 
of European Union politics (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 483–504. 
17 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European integration (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Alasdair R. Young, ‘The politics of regulation and the internal market’, in 
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of European 
Union politics (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 373–94. 
18 See e.g. Andrew Jordan, ed., Environmental policy in the European Union: actors, 
institutions and processes (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
19 See e.g. Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ‘Legitimizing the Euro-“polity” and 
its regime: the normative turn in EU studies’, European Journal of Political Theory 2: 1, 
2003, pp. 7–34; Lynn Dobson, Supranational citizenship (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005); Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Normative political theory and the European 
Union’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of 
European Union politics (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 317–35. 
return20—at a time when ‘real world’ events initiate a demand for such knowledge. The 
same might be said about attempts to develop coherent projects that apply approaches 
from the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE) to the EU following the 
initiation of the single currency.21 Meanwhile, the discussion of everyday domestic 
politics in the member and accession states becomes, out of necessity, an element of EU 
studies. Country-focused research, because of the continuous and intimate interplay 
between the EU and national levels of authority, becomes in part an adjudication of the 
impact of EU inputs upon the domestic polity—an idea that has become consolidated in 
the evolving concept of ‘Europeanization’.22 More broadly still, the recognition that 
several levels of authority operate in the EU system might be held responsible for the 
growing literature on multi-level governance (MLG) on the one hand,23 and efforts to 
rethink the EU as an analogue for federal polities on the other.24
                                                 
20 See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the “democratic deficit”: reassessing legitimacy 
in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 4, 2002, pp. 603–24; 
Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a 
response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies 44: 3, 2006, pp. 
533–62. 
21 Erik Jones and Amy Verdun, eds, The political economy of European integration: 
theory and analysis (London: Routledge, 2005). 
22 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, eds, The politics of Europeanization 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanization: 
solution or problem?’, in Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne, eds, Palgrave advances in 
European Union Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 56–76. 
23 Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, eds, Multi-level governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level governance and 
European integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
24 David McKay, Designing Europe: comparative lessons from the federal experience 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, The 
federal vision: legitimacy and levels of governance in the United States and the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 In short, events in the course of European integration (external drivers) both throw up 
issues for the pre-existing academy of EU studies to address and act as an invitation for 
scholarship from outside the conventional boundaries of EU studies to cross the border or 
perhaps to re-enter after a period of exile. It is also the case that EU topics seem to have 
become more prominent over time in the broader professional literatures of political 
science, IR and public administration. Keeler’s data for 24 academic journals between 
1960 and 2000 show a steady rise in scholarly output on the EU from the 1960s until the 
1980s and a veritable explosion through the 1990s.25
 
The picture that emerges{?} might be seen as one of an expanding community of 
scholarship featuring the evolution of a clear subfield (EU studies),{?} which has been 
underwritten by the growth of specialist journals, professional associations and their 
derivative conference circuits.26 The foregoing also suggests the heightened salience over 
time of EU topics for other substantive and subdisciplinary areas of political science and 
IR.  
 
Yet this depiction lacks a sense of how and why some literatures within EU studies rise 
and fall. Of course, the externalist position explored in this section possesses an answer in 
that we should expect straightforward symmetry between what happens in the EU or in 
the course of European integration and the scholarship that follows. The substance of EU 
studies should reflect the substance of its object. The field’s development—and, by 
implication, our evaluation of this development—becomes a largely utilitarian exercise in 
selecting the best general approach, the best theories and the best literatures from which 
to draw appropriate lessons. 
 
                                                 
25 Keeler ‘Mapping EU studies’, p. 556. 
26 Ben Rosamond, ‘The political sciences of European integration: disciplinary history 
and EU studies’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, 
Handbook of European Union politics (London: Sage, 2007),  pp. 9–13. 
Two obvious examples will help to clarify the thrust of this position. Neo-functionalist 
theories offered the dominant account of west European integration and the evolution of 
the Communities through the 1960s. Closely related to evolutionary theories of economic 
integration and rooted in a non-state-centric logic of societal pluralism, the neo-
functionalists discovered a form of integration driven by self-regarding acts of societal 
and supranational interests{?} that were in turn impelled by a logic of functional and 
(thus) political spillover.27 On the face of it, this appeared to work for the very early 
phases of the Communities’ development, and the logic of spillover seemed to be a 
genuine inductive discovery of the early drivers of west European integration. But the 
shift to national-interest-driven Community politics from the mid-1960s and the assertion 
of the primacy of intergovernmental institutional forums thereafter provided—again on 
the face of it—a better organizing narrative of the dynamics of integration.28 This was a 
better story because it conformed to the realities of integration and Community 
governance in ways which neo-functionalism increasingly could not. 
 
If neo-functionalism is the primary instance of how a theory failed according to 
externalist logic, then the case of IR provides a good example of how a (sub)disciplinary 
approach to enquiry came to be discredited. According to Hix’s powerful critique, IR 
simply asked the wrong sort of questions about the EU. To devote overwhelming 
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scholarly attention—in the manner of the standard neo-functionalist/ntergovernmentalist 
debate—to questions of the causes of integration was to miss the fact that integration 
(more or less) did not capture the motivations, preferences and institutional interactions 
of the vast bulk of resource-seeking actors within the European polity. The sights of the 
field should be reset to accommodate the concepts and categories of comparative political 
science, in part because they provide a more realistic take on what actually matters in the 
real world of EU politics.29
 
The issue of which questions guide study and which are appropriate to specific moments 
in the EU’s history is taken up by Diez and Wiener, who argue that the story of theorizing 
European integration is a tale of three macro-problems or three phases of theory-
building—‘explaining integration’, ‘analyzing governance’ and ‘constructing the EU’—
that grow out of particular phases in the history of the Communities and the EU.30 This is 
a helpful step, for two reasons. First of all, it helps us to connect the discussion of the 
general shape of EU studies to the overall evolution of its object. The core argument of 
the first phase is one between different views of the causes and implications of 
integration in the light of the remarkable prima facie challenge that the early 
Communities posed to conventional academic and policy understandings of how the 
international system should be organized, particularly in the late 1950s and early to mid-
1960s. The second of Wiener and Diez’s phases corresponds to the maturation of the 
Communities/the EU as a policy system, with debate organized around issues such as 
whether the EU is a conventional or unconventional polity, whether it deploys 
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conventional modes of governance or novel ones, and the extent to which domestic and 
supranational polities are meshed. The third phase corresponds to treaty-driven moves to 
consolidate the political character of European unity and thus brings to the fore of 
academic enquiry questions of citizenship, democracy and identity. 
 
Second, Diez and Wiener’s move is valuable in that it helps to clarify the limits of 
externalist accounts of the evolution of EU studies. Their identification of big guiding 
questions follows Wæver’s key point about how we tell the story of a field of enquiry: 
‘external explanations can sometimes . . . be better at accounting for the overall directions 
of change [in a field], but they can never explain the form that theory takes’.31 The next 
section deals with this particular question. Why, beyond the broad shadowing of the 
evolution of its empirical object, has the political science and IR of the EU adopted its 
particular forms at different times? Why, at different times, has the field been dominated 
by exchanges among scholars of a particular type? On what grounds and with what 
justification have particular approaches to or theories of the EU been deployed and/or 
rejected? 
 
Re-telling the story of EU studies 
At this stage it is important to note the insight from studies of critical disciplinary history 
that the way in which the story of a field is told is often a by-product of positional 
advantage being secured within the present of that field. Any attempt to lay out a 
consensual present ‘state of the art’ is likely to provoke what Collini, Winch and Burrow 
refer to as ‘retrospective teleology’—a narrative of the way the field has evolved that 
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converges upon and leads via a linear route to that asserted ‘state of the art’.32 Therefore, 
there is a good deal at stake in establishing a valid and uncontroversial, particular claim 
about the past of EU studies. If particular premises—say, the inappropriateness of neo-
functionalism or the marginalization of IR as a disciplinary base for EU studies—are 
accepted unconditionally, then a dual risk emerges: (a) past intellectual efforts may be 
misconstrued or misunderstood, and thus valuable insights from the past may be lost 
because it is no longer deemed necessary to read those literatures; and (b) claims to 
present intellectual status may rest not upon genuine progress from past academic work, 
but upon the mere assertion of progress. 
 
The internalist approach to discipline history tells us that there is rather more to Diez and 
Wiener’s phases of integration theory than new macro-questions growing organically out 
of what is happening in the EU in particular sections of its evolution. We have already 
noted that the selection of an approach or a theory is in itself a significant driver of the 
reality that is observed. In other words, the relationship between the object of knowledge 
and the generation of knowledge is reciprocal rather than one-way. There is thus also 
much more to the demise of neo-functionalism and the claims about IR’s marginality 
than a straightforward failure to secure ‘truth’ about European integration and the EU. 
 
Based on the preceding paragraphs, this section seeks to develop an internalist 
understanding of the evolution of EU studies in two steps. The first uses Diez and 
Wiener’s phases as a template to uncover the various shifts in the cadence of academic 
discourses of the EU. The second revisits the ‘mainstreaming’ versus ‘pluralism’ 
continuum developed above to make a forward-looking argument about how some views 
about advancement in EU studies and the state of the art in the field rest on potentially 
problematic readings of the past. In other words, what follows is a kind of double 
reading, where the first ‘internalist’ take on the evolution of the field seeks to disrupt 
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complacent and unilinear understandings of EU studies in a way that requires critical 
interrogation of ‘presentist’ depictions of the field’s past. 
 
The changing cadence of academic discourses on the EU and European integration  
The first academic work on European integration did not emerge in an intellectual 
vacuum. Haas’s The Uniting of Europe, first published in 1958, offered the first statement 
of the prolific integration theory (neo-functionalist) research programme that held sway 
in US political science circles, particularly in the pages of the journal International 
Organization, for the next decade and a half. The assignment to this phase by Diez and 
Wiener of the macro-issue ‘explaining integration’ is appropriate because the scholarship 
was driven by an ambition to go beyond the confines of the European case with a view to 
provoking general insights about regional integration. Neo-functionalist integration 
theory was underwritten by a Weberian social scientific commitment to theory-building 
and the robust exposure of theoretical precepts to empirical scrutiny.33 It drew on at least 
two additional impulses. First, Haas—in particular—sat at the cutting edge of political 
science discussions of the technocratic and pluralistic character of advanced industrial 
societies. Neo-functionalism was thus located in broader concerns about the operation of 
rationality, albeit in conditions bounded by cognitions and underlying value sets,34 and 
about the consequences of and possibilities for complex societal pluralism. Haas foresaw 
integration as a form of pluralist community construction that would emerge above the 
nation-state and would develop through the aggregate actions of self-interested agents 
operating at first within the confines of territory-bound pluralism. Indeed, high levels of 
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societal pluralism came to be seen as one of the key independent background conditions 
that explained the capacity of a regional integration scheme to survive beyond its 
initiation phase.35 Second, neo-functionalism was developed in contradistinction to two 
broad narratives of how order was achieved in international politics: realism (the primacy 
of power politics) and liberal idealism (the construction of international institutions). The 
neo-functionalists belonged to a third school that sought to show how systemic ordering 
consequences could flow from the apparently mundane interest-driven acts of social 
groups.36
 
The key point here is that the dominant school of thinking about European integration—
as least in the US context—was located centrally in the mainstream conceptual, empirical 
and methodological concerns of US political science as they stood in the 1960s. The most 
common ‘other’ of neo-functionalism identified by its discussants tends to be 
intergovernmentalism—an alternate set of propositions about which actors matter in the 
integration process. No doubt the critiques elaborated by (especially) Hoffmann and 
Hansen were important in that they forced reconsideration of certain core premises and 
emphases within neo-functionalism, 37 but in terms of broad analytical approach—
questions of commitment to theory-building, criteria for theoretical evaluation and core 
ontological rationalism—less than might be supposed separated early neo-functionalism 
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from the coherent intergovernmentalist rival that was laid out subsequently.38 In so far as 
this first phase can be treated in terms of a rivalry between neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, then, the contest is of the ‘first order’ (competing hypotheses with 
shared epistemological and ontological commitment) rather than rooted in a deeper 
‘second order’ (metatheoretical) disagreement.39 It is also fair to argue that neo-
functionalism versus intergovernmentalism is a debate from within the liberal tradition of 
IR. To class intergovernmentalists (and especially Moravcsik) as ‘realists’ is to 
misunderstand the development of liberal institutionalist IR over the past three decades. 
 
Perhaps a more telling contrast might be that drawn between the discipline-driven 
integration theory project that was being developed in the United States and the emerging 
inductive, perhaps historicist and certainly self-consciously multidisciplinary approach 
that was emerging in the pages of the UK-based Journal of Common Market Studies 
(JCMS), founded in 1962).40 The contrast should not be overdrawn, but the emergence of 
a strong alternative intellectual tradition—where a stylized opposition between 
alternative first-level narratives of European integration was not necessarily the norm—as 
exemplified by the early JCMS needs to be added to the picture. The related distinctions 
between inductive and deductive approaches, problem-driven and theory-driven research, 
and disciplinary knowledge versus areas studies have all been played out in EU studies, 
most notably in the 1990s amid discussions about the funding of European studies in the 
United States.41 If anything, this is a more enduring and more significant cleavage in the 
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field of EU studies: the contrast between ‘Europeanists’ on the one hand and ‘political 
scientists with an interest in the EU’ on the other.42 Not only does it cut to the heart of the 
‘mainstreaming’–‘pluralism’ continuum identified above, it also shines a light on the 
quite different national ‘cultural institutional complexes’ within which academic work on 
the EU is produced.43 Academic cultures where norms and expectations are more 
discipline-driven (mainstream US political science being the obvious case in point) are 
likely to provoke different types of work from cultures with a greater tolerance of more 
ideographic{?} and multidisciplinary forms of enquiry (the UK perhaps). 
 
Standard representations of first-phase integration theory perhaps overstate the existence 
of a great neo-functionalist–intergovernmentalist debate and in so doing neglect the 
subtle development of neo-functionalist integration theory and the nuanced auto-critiques 
that its practitioners developed. Serious attempts to recast neo-functionalism as a theory 
of background conditions, together with attempts to specify the conditions under which 
dis-integration would take place and a growing concern with the operation of knowledge 
and cognition in the integration process are all under way in the course of neo-
functionalist theorizing.44 Yet standard representations seem keen to depict first-phase 
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integration theory as little more than a series of largely static propositions about 
‘spillover’ and a determination to prove that non-state actors and supranational 
entrepreneurs matter. 
 
Two myths should perhaps be laid to rest about neo-functionalism.45 First, as already 
suggested, to describe first-phase integration theory as in some ways detached from the 
pursuit of scientific rigour is absurd, given the continuing and overt commitment to 
theory-building and the determination, especially among the neo-functionalists, to work 
at the cutting edge methodologically. There might be an honest argument to be had about 
the dominance in certain quarters of EU studies of largely descriptive work, but that is 
not how some interventions claiming to supply—at last—social scientific rigour to the 
study of the EU frame themselves.46 Second, to locate the work of phase one integration 
theorists as firmly in the IR camp is quite unhelpful. In many ways, integration was an 
intervention in IR akin to IPE’s later insistence that the divide between the domestic and 
the international levels of analysis is false and misleading.47 It was an intervention—like 
the slightly earlier work of Karl Deutsch on transactions and international community-
building48—rooted in a political science that saw application well beyond the boundaries 
of domestic politics. The work of Lindberg, and later Lindberg and Scheingold, is 
illustrative here in that it began to treat the EU as a political system in line with the 
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hugely influential work of David Easton.49 Some of Haas’s late empirical work on 
integration and ‘turbulent fields’ anticipated later policy analytic work concerned with 
actors in conditions of imperfect knowledge using cooperation and institution-building as 
a means to rectify knowledge deficits. 
 
This{?} provides a bridge to the second phase and further important arguments about the 
drift away from the classical macro-theories of integration. As noted above, the 
recognition of the EU as a policy system or a polity in its own right long pre-dates the 
assertion in EU studies that this is the most fruitful ontology.50 There are perhaps two 
further big internalist drivers of the shift away from the problematique of integration in 
EU studies from the late 1980s and into the 1990s. The first is rooted in the logic of the 
standard theory-building norms of mainstream political science. The move to treat the 
Communities/EU as a polity or a policy system did not emerge simply from the increased 
supply of supranational policy outputs and the dramatically enhanced clustering of 
organized interests in Brussels. It also had much to do with the quest for analytical 
leverage and the very acutely perceived problem that, if treated as an instance of 
integration, the EU was looking into the abyss of the great social scientific elephant trap 
where n = 1. The argument of comparative politics scholars and policy analysts was that 
the EU would cease to be sui generis if it were recast and redefined accordingly. This 
would facilitate comparison and thus generate analytical leverage as opposed to thick 
description/journalism. 
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The retreat from integration as a guiding problem was also bound up with a heightened 
discipline-wide suspicion of the prospects for all-encompassing grand theory and an 
embrace of the middle range. The core idea of middle-range theory is that it is domain-
specific; that phenomena such as the EU are broken down into component processes and 
subparts, each of which is comparable with functionally equivalent processes and 
subparts in other contexts. So instead of there being theories of the EU (just as there are 
not conventional theories of British, German or French politics), elements of EU politics 
are brought into—for example—the analysis of executive, legislative and judicial 
politics, the analysis of policy networks and agenda-setting, and the discussion of the 
formation and consolidation of cleavage structures.51 Middle-range analysis, 
conventionally at least, imagines a range of theoretical debates at different levels or 
domains of the EU system, in which rival hypotheses are tested with a view to increasing 
the social{?} of scientifically valid knowledge.52
 
In addition to standard logics of theory-building, the demise of ‘integration’ as the core 
issue of academic work on the EU{?}, also reflects trends in the wider political sciences 
and the emergence of large literatures where parts of the EU are tested or taken on board 
as a case. Four such (overlapping) literatures have been especially prominent since the 
1980s and help to account for the move into the phase two polity discussion as defined by 
Diez and Wiener. The first consists of applications of rational choice analysis, arguably 
the dominant stream in American political science in recent decades, to the study of the 
executive, legislative, judicial, public opinion and domestic politics aspects of the EU,53 a 
trend underwritten by the appearance the journal European Union Politics in 2000. The 
                                                 
51 See Hix, Political system; Jeremy Richardson, ed. European Union: power and policy-
making, 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2005). 
52 John Peterson, ‘The choice for EU theorists: establishing a common framework for 
analysis’, Journal of Common Market Studies 39: 3, 2001, pp. 289–318. 
53 Mark A. Pollack, ‘Rational choice and EU politics’, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. 
Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, Handbook of European Union politics (London: Sage, 
2007), pp. 31–55. 
second uses the EU as a venue for new institutionalist political science in all of its 
forms—rational choice, historical and sociological.54 As an institutionalized arena (in 
both formal and informal senses), the EU has been used for the discussion of, 
respectively, (a) the processing and reconciliation of competing preferences, (b) the 
logics of path dependency, where decisions on institutional design taken at one point in 
time may lock in and influence/constrain actors’ encounters with subsequent imperatives, 
and (c) the capacity of institutional interactivity to socialize actors, constructing their 
preferences and identities. Institutionalist approaches have also been important within 
liberal IR in the United States, and the influence of liberal institutionalism is evident in a 
number of key texts.55 The third literature is the broad sweep of policy analysis, which 
was deemed to have reached a state of scientific maturity at the foundation of the Journal 
of European Public Policy in 1994.56 The fourth literature—that of ‘new governance’—
overlaps significantly with that of policy analysis, but is perhaps distinguished by its 
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emphasis on the less hierarchical elements of goal-oriented forms of coordinated action 
and by its tendency to conceptualize the EU as a (possibly novel) governance system.57
 
A combination of standard norms of theory-building and the burgeoning of a clutch of 
influential literatures continues to influence the span of EU studies. To this we add the 
internalist drivers of Diez and Wiener’s third phase—‘constructing Europe’. While the 
recent turn towards moral and political philosophy in EU studies may have been largely 
provoked by the ‘demand for answers’ induced by post-Maastricht treaty-building, the 
major innovation in this phase appears to be the opening up of a ‘second order’ 
discussion between rationalism and constructivism. At first sight, the organization of EU 
studies into these two camps would seem to mirror precisely the rationalist–constructivist 
cleavage in (American) IR that has opened up since the early 1990s at least.58 There are, 
after all, parallel attempts to build bridges between rationalists and constructivists in both 
IR and EU studies, on the assumption that despite micro-foundational ontological 
differences (roughly a contest between, on the one hand, the world as populated by 
strategic utility maximizers with exogenously determined preferences and, on the other, 
the world, and thus interests and identities, as socially constructed), there is 
epistemological compatibility. This, in turn, promises the possibility of competitive 
hypothesis-testing within a common framework of social scientific purpose.59 The 
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pronounced in EU studies, in part because is not just IR-variant constructivism that acts 
as the inspiration for scholars interested in the social construction of integration.60 Work 
rooted more firmly in discourse analysis than conventional IR constructivism is prone to 
treat the EU as an arena for the exchange and expression of multiple subjectivities. If 
power resides in the capacity to generate realities through acts of discursive construction, 
then the ontological commitment to a social world carries epistemological consequences 
that make it impossible for this type of analysis to break bread with rationalism on 
rationalism’s terms.61
 
The distinctiveness of the types of constructivism at work within EU studies is not simply 
metatheoretical; it is also substantive. It is tempting to rely upon an externalist 
understanding to suggest that there is an obvious relationship between the highly 
institutionalized and multilevel quality of the EU and the exploration by constructivist 
projects on Europe of both the role of deliberation, socialization and persuasion within 
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formal and informal institutional venues and the exchanges between EU-level and 
domestic norms. The internalist add-on is to stress the particular influence of 
Habermasian communicative action perspectives upon EU scholarship—itself related to 
the significant number of German-trained social scientists now working in EU studies.62
 
Recovering EU studies past for EU studies future 
In summary, in all three phases the form taken by EU studies is influenced by the 
complex intersection of the field with its broad intellectual location, namely the social 
sciences generally and the political sciences in particular. This underlines the point made 
earlier about scholarly contingency. This section turns more directly to matters of 
disciplinary politics in EU studies. The utilitarian conception of ‘best fit’ between 
approach/theory and object cross-cuts with rival and varying conceptions of what 
constitutes ‘best’ in this context. This in turn suggests that the ebbs and flows of EU 
studies have not followed the operation of a free market in approaches, theories and 
techniques. All but the most relativist of scholars would in any case reject the 
appropriateness of a laissez-faire or ‘anything goes’ approach to the study of social 
phenomena. There needs to be some adjudication and review of different approaches. The 
key issue is whether this adjudication takes place in terms that are, to all intents and 
purposes, fair. 
 
The problem, of course, is that alternative positions on the mainstreaming–pluralism 
continuum of disciplinary politics bring forth quite different conceptions of how a field 
like EU studies progresses and rival understandings of the means by which the best work 
in judged. In the ultimate ‘mainstreaming’ position sits a resolutely Kuhnian aspiration to 
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achieve a ‘normal science’ in EU studies.63 Such work would be rooted squarely in the 
bounded mainstream of political science and would proceed from a tight set of agreed 
axiomatic premises. Knowledge is accumulated in the context of the resultant paradigms, 
not by challenging their assumptions and engaging in ‘dissenting’ forms of work. This 
Kuhnian view has found voice within EU studies, particularly from scholars affiliated to 
the project of rational choice institutionalism,64 which in turn draws heavily upon the 
research published in the highest-impact American journals of political science. Recent 
EU studies work is shot through with interventions that endorse, in one way or another, 
this Kuhnian stance. There is talk of the recent arrival of ‘professionalism’ in the field,65 
the welcome import of research standards that apply in other subfields of political 
science,66 and, in the context of the rise of work on the EU inspired by social choice 
theory, relief that work is no longer ‘wholly descriptive’.67 As indicated above, there is 
compelling evidence to cast doubt on each of these claims. The fact that such claims are 
made suggests that part of the ‘mainstreaming tendency’ wishes to do more than simply 
establish a ‘normal scientific’ island amid the archipelago of EU studies. These are more 
expansive claims that compare present rigour with past lack of rigour and, in so doing, 
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implicitly attack contemporary work that fails to subscribe to the strict norms of best 
practice being advanced. 
 
In the disciplinary politics of EU studies, the challenge for pluralists would seem to be to 
counter these tendencies without imposing a form of intellectual isolationism, where each 
island in the EU studies archipelago is a subdisciplinary autarchy with little motivation to 
communicate with the others. One approach is to begin with the externalist argument that 
the EU is different, that it should provoke us—as Ruggie argues—to ‘think otherwise’ 
about world politics;68 that because it is governed by context-specific rationalities, even 
its component parts cannot be captured with the crude universalizing logic of rational 
choice. This view finds clearest expression in work that commences from the premise 
that the EU’s institutional environment does more than simply shape the behaviour of its 
component actors (assumed, under the axioms of rational choice, to be entering those 
institutional settings with pre-defined utility functions). Rather, the EU is held to be 
peculiarly transformative of interests and identities.69 The proposition that these{?} are 
endogenous to institutional interaction is one way in which mainstreaming ambitions 
might be tempered, not least because the deductive logic of rational choice-like political 
science actually tends to rule out this possibility a priori.70 In other words, effective 
pluralism in EU studies can be rendered possible through carefully worked out 
propositions which require the field to be left open and which, in turn, highlight some of 
the closures that certain approaches might bring. 
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The suggestion here, in addition, is that effective openness and pluralism require a more 
purposeful first step, which at first sight appears to be a step backwards into the realms of 
disciplinary history.71 Internalist readings of the course of EU studies have the capacity 
to reveal the operation of scholarly contingency and disciplinary politics over time. This 
has two broad implications for any ‘presentist’ reading of the evolution of EU studies. 
First, it forces any scholar of the EU to ask about their own intellectual coordinates in the 
present and to force a more reflexive engagement with the conditions under which claims 
deriving from narratives of the past of the field are made. Second, and paradoxically, it 
shines a light on the operation of disciplinary politics in the past. For advocates of 
professionalization and the pursuit of rigour in the present, there is a salutary lesson about 
the operation of such practices—and their achievements in the past. The net effect should 
be a more respectful and less stylized depiction of past schools of thought. Within the 
integration theory project of neo-functionalism, for example, lay rather more than the 
static image of a few propositions about non-state actors and forms of spillover that tends 
to feature in most contemporary descriptions. This is not to privilege the neo-functionalist 
legacy of work on background conditions, bounded rationality, cognitive change and dis-
integration, but merely to suggest that progress in EU studies may follow from an honest 
intellectual audit of the many and varied strands of the field’s past. 
  
Conclusion 
Throughout the past half-century the EU, because of its inherent empirical fascination, 
has provided a highly attractive venue for the practice of scholarship. But it is also a good 
place to observe scholarly contingency and the enactment of disciplinary politics within 
the political sciences. The argument put here is that the case for thinking more thoroughly 
about disciplinary history is not archaeological, but essential to the present and future 
health of the field of EU studies. None of the foregoing is designed to head off 
scholarship or stop it moving in particular directions. Rather, the intention is to raise 
awareness of two things: (a) the key ‘internalist’ drivers of the field’s evolution, and thus 
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(b) the (disciplinary) political quality of much of what constitutes itself as departure from 
the intellectual past. 
 
As such, the practice of critical disciplinary history is designed to achieve three 
outcomes. First, it seeks to deliver fair and text-based (as opposed to reputation-based) 
accounts of past scholarly efforts. In so doing it keeps open the possibility that the 
archive of research on European integration contains insights from the past that might 
prove prescient in the present. Second, a proper application of critical disciplinary history 
requires a more nuanced pedagogy in EU studies. As scholars, we need to know who we 
are, how we got here and where we might be going. But our choice of how we read 
theoretical ‘progress’ and how we tell stories about disciplinary evolution is not a neutral 
one. To understand the history of EU studies as a linear matter of increasingly 
sophisticated theoretical choice that brings us ever closer to the truth may be 
optimistically ‘whiggish’, but it is only one reading of the field’s history. Moreover, it is 
a reading that has the effect of justifying a ‘normal science’ of EU Studies in the sense 
that Kuhn was keen to promote for the natural sciences. Thus, finally, continuous 
reflection on the historiography of the field is one way to counteract the negative 
disciplining side of some scholarly work that tends towards the mainstream pole. 
